Harold F. Hallett
On a Reputed Equivoque
in the Philosophy of Spinoza
Review of Metaphysics, 3 (1949)
Among the various ambiguities which have been invented (and I use
the word equivocally) in the philosophy of Spinoza, and have been held to be
fatal in respect of this or that part of it, or of the whole, none seems to have
been so generally, and so undoubtingly, noted as his identification of the bodily
correlate of the human mind with its physical object in Ethices II.,
xiii. And certainly no error (if it is an error) could be more fundamentally
fatal to the whole speculation; an equivocal use of the term “idea” as at once
the mental correlate of some neural or physiological state of the body of the
percipient, and also the essentia objectiva of a thing extrinsic to that
body – involving the simple identification of the human body with the object
of the human mind that animates it – would seem to be a confusion at the source,
infecting the whole system. 1
I
Yet this very confusion was confidently attributed to Spinoza by
Pollock in what was the first thoroughgoing exposition of his philosophy written
in English. 2 In the Tractatus
de Intellectus Emendatione, 3
Pollock tells us, an “idea” is “a conscious state of the knowing
mind, in which the object known is represented”. “If I think of Peter, the state
of my [189] consciousness is an idea of Peter according to Spinoza’s
first usage of he term”; but, he says, Spinoza also conceives an “idea” of my
mind as corresponding, not with Peter who is other than myself, but with
my own body: and Pollock was evidently thinking of the Proposition
I have named, which affirms that “the object of the idea constituting the human
mind is the body... and nothing else”. He then goes on to remark, with the air
of counsel hurriedly briefed to clear up a case against a taciturn prisoner in
a few words of plain commonsense about the law, that “a man can easily think
of his own body, but he is not always doing so, and when he does his thought
will not be accurate unless he has learnt something of physiology. And even if
every human being were an accomplished physiologist, the constant relation of
the mind as a whole to the body as a whole would still be something different
from the relation of the knowing to the known”. On the evidence of such naive
and hasty lucubrations, the jury (with one or two doubting exceptions) have brought
in a verdict of “Guilty” – and that in spite of the irrepressible aside of a
footnote from counsel himself that “Spinoza himself once (sic) calls attention
to the distinction: Eth. 2. 17, schol.” 4
– for is not the prisoner thus condemned out of his own mouth?
It will be my business in what follows to show, in my “longwinded”
manner, 5 that we have here no callow
confusion to be thus disposed of, but the very quintessence of Spinoza’s solution
of the otherwise insoluble problems of human epistemology and ontology.
It might have been supposed that no one but an eminent lawyer applying
his great powers beyond their scope could have been willing to make so dubious
and laconic a plea with so little reflection; but evidently it is still possible
for even a patient and critical mind, like that of my former teacher and honoured
friend the late Henry Barker, in commenting on the [190] case, to attempt
to substantiate it in “a rather fuller statement”. 6
Since, however, this more ample statement is based upon precisely the same fundamental
assumptions, it is no matter for wonder that Barker has to conclude by agreeing
with Pollock that “when Spinoza speaks of the mind as idea sive cognitio corporis,
he is confused and is using the word idea in a new and strange way”. What
is wonderful is that Barker, who makes real progress towards a resolution of
the seeming equivocation by distinguishing two sets of relations, the causal
and the “instrumental”, fails at the crucial point correctly to apply the results
of his analysis by supposing that the two sets form a single series – whereas
in obvious fact they belong to distinct perspectives: that of the percipient
himself, and that of another percipient.
II
What, then, is this fundamental assumption which I have imputed
to these writers as involving them in the judgement that Spinoza is “interpreting
correspondence in two ways, epistemological and physiological, without clearly
realizing that he was doing so”? I reply that it is their eccentric commonsense
view of the nature of perception, derived from current post-Spinozistic empiricism,
and infecting even the idealistic critics of that doctrine. It is commonly supposed
that when a perceiver perceives an external object, e.g. the sun, “the
sun (to quote Barker) as a cause sets up light waves which travel to the earth,
affect the body or eye, and so initiate a physiological process which causes
a brain change, in virtue of which, as a condition, perception of the sun takes
place. The series of events that starts from the sun and has its physical (or
physiological) termination in the brain is in its earlier stages a causal series,
but in its last stage, viz. that in which perception takes place, and
in which the brain functions as the organ or instrument of the mind, we had better
describe it by another [191] adjective such as ‘instrumental’, for the relation
of mind to body or brain is so intimate that the notion of causal action seems
inappropriate”. 7 On this view we
have a causal physical and physiological process followed by a psycho-physical
“fact” or miracle – according as mind is regarded as epiphenomenal or “substantial”.
I suppose that this account of the processes and relations involved
in perception strikes the commonsense empiricistic reader as a plain recital
of fact, or of theory directly based on fact, and too obvious to be open to question
– it must do so since so many otherwise astute philosophers have accepted it
as the factual basis of the theory of perception – and that in spite of all the
multiplex difficulties and paradoxes that have in it their fons et origo.
Of scientists and the vulgar I need not speak, for their naiveties in this sphere
can do little harm, and perhaps some good. Nevertheless, in truth, we have here
not a description of perception as it is, and truly, for the perceiver, but only
of the processes associated with perception as observed by a percipient
other than the one whose perception is supposed to be under investigation.
Nor even this, for the last and crucial stage in the process is by nature unobservable,
and must be imputed. When this is taken as an account of perception in itself
it is no wonder that we become involved in a farrago of absurdities: perceptio
a non percipiendo! For just as in this observed process the perception alone
is unobservable, and must be imputed as a “fact” or miracle, so per contra
in perception itself, and for the perceiver, this objective process is nowhere
to be found, but only the perceptual relation between the percipient mind and
an object that it directly perceives: here it is the causal process that must
be imputed.
Thus, of the two sets of relations distinguished by Barker, the
one is experienced only by the percipient himself; the other is what is observed,
not as relating the percipient and the sun in the act of perception, but as relating
another man’s mind (conceived as in his head), his body, the medium, and
the [192] sun as objects of external observation. Pollock and those who
agree with him are involved in confusion because they appear to regard perception-in-act
as a mere “shortcircuiting” of the elaborate processes observed by another, by
which the causal processes are “telescoped-in”, and only the socalled “instrumental”
remain in sight, by reason of the special position of the percipient viewing
the causal processes as it were “end on”. Spinoza, on the contrary, is involved
in no confusion since for him what is prior is the direct perception of the object,
and the causal processes are “telescoped-out” by projection on the eccentric
axes of another perceiver. He does not suppose that this direct perception
is incorrigible, but it is not corrigible by reference to what another
percipient directly perceives (and imputes) – for that too is equally corrigible,
so that this way lies not correction but confusion. If we are to analyse perception,
it is perception-in-act that we must investigate, and not perception as it is
observed and imputed by another.
III
In perception-in-act, then, there is a direct perceptual relation
of the percipient and the object that he perceives: how do we come to represent
the perceptual relation of another percipient to the thing that we suppose
him to be perceiving (“suppose” because he alone perceives it, and he cannot
inform us that what he perceives is the thing that we perceive) as a set of causal
relations between the thing and the perceiver’s central nervous system, followed
by a psycho-physical “fact” or miracle? The man who perceives the sun does not
at the same time perceive his own body or sense-organ with its cerebral connexions
interposed between “him” and the sun. He is aware neither of a causal process
with its terminal cerebral agitation, nor of any psycho-physical relation or
transition “in his head”. True, when he thinks that he knows by other means how
the sun should appear, and notes that for his perception it appears otherwise,
he is apt (in the absence of any previously unnoted external condition, such
as the dark glasses on his nose) to [193] assign the difference to the abnormality
of his sense-organism. But this inference is posterior to his objective interpretation
of the situation in physical, physiological and psycho-physical terms, and not
the immediate deliverance of his own perception, nor based on any premiss thence
derived. Indeed, if he does think of his own optical system (on the analogy of
the dark glasses on his nose) as interposed between “him” and the sun, it is
as a “transparency” which (by reason of commonsense assumptions) may be regarded
as more or less darkened or contorted by optical defect, jaundiced by pathological
condition, or over-stimulated to an eccentric response. In other sense no man
can be said to see his own eye-in-act among the objects that he sees. And the
same is true of his whole body regarded as the objective instrument of perception
as it is conceived ab extra.
In actual perceptual experience, of course, the situation is complicated
and confused in so far as one sense-organ is instrumental in the external observation
of another as an object in the world of that element of the total perception
for which it is not instrumental. With the hand we can feel the eye as an object
in the world mediated by touch; with the eye we can see the hand as a visual
object; and so forth. And it is all too easy and seductive to complete these
partial objective appearances by way of imagination to the form of a body among
(and like) the observed bodies of other men which, as objects, are not subject
to this strict privation. The mirror seems to bear this out, though what the
mirror shows is what another would see if placed behind the mirror with the mercury
removed. Thus, though we cannot see our eye-in-act we believe that it is there
just as others see it, and we feel it, and see it in the mirror, and we presume
that it is but an accident of position that prevents us from seeing it directly
for ourselves – an accident of bodily structure similar to that which prevents
us from seeing the back of our neck (which also we can see in a mirror). Yet
it is no mere accident, but the very essence of the situation: neither
the eye itself, nor anything else, is standing in the way of the eye, and shutting
it off from the sight of [194] itself. On the contrary, it is revealing
itself as it is in act, and by so doing revealing its world of visual objects
– as it were patterned upon its transparency. And so of all the sense-organs:
their absence from the worlds of objects in relation to which (as distinct objects
for other men) they appear as instrumental, is the very ground of their instrumentality:
they are absent from among these objects because in some manner they are
present in them all. We may go so far as to say that for visual perception
the eye-in-act is the visual field in which the objects of vision are related
and distributed – though its appearance as field reciprocates with the appearance
of objects, partial or total, upon it. For the eye that sees no object sees not
at all, and is no eye-in-act. 8 And
so, mutatis mutandis, of the whole body in the complex perception of its
world. The “body” which is the real correlate of the percipient mind is
not the object of some other mind, is not the “body” as it is observed
ab extra (and even in part by the mutual instrumentality of its members),
but the “body” as is in itself, and which as affected by other bodies,
is the object of the mind’s perception. The real correlate is the
object, but not one of the objects constituting the mind’s world: it is
the mind’s world operating as its measure of the real world that transcends it;
it is the body with the affectiones concomitant with its relation with
an extrinsic complement which thus only is represented in it. The body as it
is in itself is, as it were, an instrument which manifests and measures the universe,
and its affectiones are the “pointer-readings” to its other on the “scale”
of its nature, by which that nature is in determinate reciprocation with its
complement – a complement which is thus perceived in projection: in the
form of the spatio-temporal transparency that is the objective appearance of
the body itself in relation with its complement, decorated and shadowed with
the unintelligible data which are the objective appearance of the transcendence
of the world of others in relation with the body whose complement it is. As Berkeley [195]
suggests, 9 the form of space timelessly
objectifies the unimpeded agency of the body; and we may add that the durational
“materials of sense” objectify the modifications of the body by reason of its
response to the complex impedance of the other. And thus the world of perception
is the objective appearance of the body as “affected” by its active complement
in Nature, and its objectivity but a sign and symbol of the relative impotence
of the body in comparison with the magnipotence of its complement. For bodies
and the universe, in themselves, are not mere “things”, but agents, and
their objective appearances but privations of mutual projection. 10
IV
This brings me to Spinoza’s own account of the human body and its
“affectiones”. By an “affectio” in general Spinoza
means any state of an entity referable to what is distinct from the entity itself.
“affectio”, “modus”, and “modificatio” are terms interchangeable
save by special usage in different connexions (e.g. a “mode” or “affectio”
of Substance is an [196] individual thing 11
which, again, may be variously “affected” by other individual things or “modes”
of Substance – thus having its own “affectiones”; but even here the “modes”
“affect” one another only because all are “affectiones” or “modes” of
Substance). 12 Take now two interacting
modes of Extension, e.g. a diminutive and a bulky body in impact: they
can impinge on one another only because both are modes of Extension; their “action
and reaction” at impact are “equal and opposite” because, as Newton says, 13
the vis insita of each is an evocation of the vis impressa of the
other (the vis inertiae of each measuring only the complete impotence
of its isolation – for, ex hypothesi, it has no other to accelerate or
retard, and its “inertia” is its impotence to accelerate or retard itself); but
the “affectiones” of the two bodies are different by reason of their difference
of bulk – the diminutive body being most “affected”: their changes of speed being
inversely proportional to their bulks. This is an elementary example of the general
principle that the “affectio” of a thing is a function of its own nature and
of the nature of the other by which it is “affected”; for though the affectio
is a state of the thing itself, and belongs to it as a distinct entity, it is
a state that is in part determined by the nature of its other. Because the mutually
actualizing “action and reaction” are “equal and opposite”, and the bulks are
different, the “affectiones” (i.e. the acceleration or retardation)
are different in inverse proportion to their differing bulks. 14
Furthermore, these “affectiones” (as our example also illustrates)
in the end constitute the things said to be “affected”. There can be no
isolated body (for the vis inertiae of the isolated body is total impotence
– it is actualized as vis insita only by reaction to vis impressa);
save as affected by another it is nothing. We thus reach the general principle
that a finite [197] thing is what it is solely by reason of its reciprocation
with a complement, and has its perfect nature only by reciprocation with its
exhaustive complement in Nature. It is thus that it is constituted by
its affectiones, and what are commonly regarded as its special affectiones
with respect to this or that selected other are but differentiations of its constitutive
affectiones. As Whitehead has expressed the same doctrine (for “there
is no new thing under the sun”) there are no “things” having “simple location”
and standing in “external relations” with other things.
It is of first importance, however, not to fall into the error
of supposing that this implies that a body is nothing but a conventional focus
characterized by the resultant of world-forces as concentrated upon it
(on the analogy of the “centre of gravity” of a body). This might be adequate
enough as a description of any supposed mere point-instant on which these forces
converge – for then the resultant is zero, and the point-instant nothing actual
at all. Each body, on the contrary, is a part of the universe, affected not by
the whole but by its complement in the whole; and in so far as it is actual
it has its own nature as reactive to the action of that complement. Though
an isolated body is nothing, as reactive to its complement it is actual
with that complement. To return to our example: in impact, each of the
impinging bodies has its vis insita evoked by the vis impressa
from its other, and operating by way of reaction. 15
Thus, each body is a reactive localization of its complement, and its
actuality is its reagency. It is thus only that the universe of bodies is actual:
for if each were but the resultant at a conventional focus of the actions of
all others, similarly defined, all [198] would be reduced to nonentity in
a vicious circle of vires inertiae. And a world of point-instants would be doubly
inert – the very acme of nonentity. 16
Each body, then, is the reactive focalization of its world, and
when two bodies are conceived as affecting each other, their affectiones
are not in truth modifications supervenient upon their otherwise wholly independent
absolute natures, but differentiations of the integral reactivity of all other
bodies as focalized in them. The reagency of each is the evocation of the agency
of all others, and the affectiones of each are the changes in its abstract
nature reciprocating with the abstracted agency of this or that extrinsic
body. Here we are dealing with an abstracted partial system of bodies, and in
that reference an affected body suffers a change of its abstracted nature, and
its modification or “affectio” with respect to its other registers the change
suffered by its actual nature as abstracted – a change which, in respect
of its total nature may be either a privation or an achievement. For its
other may be either an aid or a hindrance to its perfection. It cannot but change
its abstract temporal actuality, but this change may either involve concretion
with Nature or further abstraction from it.
In the interaction of finite bodies, therefore, the affectiones
partake both of the nature of the body affected and of that of its other – its
own nature being, as it were, the scale on which its pointer indicates the power
of its other. Just as the galvanometer measures with its needle on its disc the
value of this or that selected electromagnetic field only by reason of its inductive
reaction to that field, so the human body reactively focalizes its world, so
that its special affectiones are differential pointer-readings on its
scales, distributively measuring the reagency to it of all other bodies in that
world to which it is capable of reacting. And the principle must be fully generalized
– for all bodies whatsoever, like the galvanometer and [199] the human body,
are composed of parts similarly related in their orders to reciprocal complements,
measuring them in their own ways, by the pointers of “affectio” on the scales
of their own natures, ad indefinitum. The reactive essence of every finite
body is a “pole” of the “universal” stress at that level in the hierarchy of
Nature: an agency “equal and opposite” to the agency of its congruent complement.
In speaking of the “hierarchy of Nature” I am thinking of the doctrine
of orders of corporeal individuality expounded by Spinoza in Ethices II.,
Lem. vii. Sch. An individual is actual, not by aggregation but by reciprocal
action of its parts; “and each part is actual only as the reactive focalization
of all others. Each part in so far as it is individual is a microcosm of the
whole, and thus also ultimately of the macrocosm. It reproduces its whole, and
the whole, in the degree in which its complement can affect it, i.e.
in the degree of its microcosmicity; and the nature of the microcosm is contributed
to the whole both as affected part and as reactive focalization of its complement
in turn, in due measure, affecting that complement. But the “contribution” is
not by way of addition, but by way of expression more or less eccentric
according to the status of the part and its abstractedness.
I have made use of the analogy of the scale and pointer-reading,
and it may be well to consider the adequacy of the analogue: measures are, of
course, always relative to a unit of measurement, and the calibration of the
scale of a measuring instrument is essentially conventional. Thus the value of
a pointer-reading on a scale is absolute only in so far as an absolute unit can
be provided. It is thus that in our mathematical formulae for expressing the
laws of nature the pointer-readings of our instruments always qualify variables
which stand for the absolute scales which the conventional scales of our instruments
are made to represent. By themselves pointer-readings are of course without significance.
The footrule measures distances, e clock durations, the galvanometer electromagnetic
forces, and the human body the world of things by which it is affected, only
in so far as these instruments, and the calibration of their [200] scales,
can be taken to be absolute. In scientific practice the pointer-reading is significant
because all that is required is a comparative measure of the variable; but for
natural philosophy a more concrete attitude is desirable: the instrument is a
part of the physical world short-circuiting its own nature in its scale as calibrated
from a zero of abstract isolation, so that it gives only a differential measure
of the abstracted other that differentially affects it. But when we come to deal
with the human body, as the fundamental instrument of human observation, an instrument
that is inescapable yet not itself observed in act (or capable of being calibrated
in relation to an observed other), this shortcircuiting ceases to be tolerable
to the philosopher, and he is compelled to note, not merely its comparative pointer-readings
on its native scale, but also the nature of the variable itself which constitutes
that scale, and makes it humanly absolute (though not therefore universally incorrigible).
At least he must do so if he is to gain true knowledge of the physical universe
which integrates the body and the world that transcends the bodily instrument
of observation. Not merely the magnitude of the bodily affectiones but
their nature must be considered – all, indeed, that the shortcircuiting of the
instrument neglects when we merely take its pointer-reading. And, of course,
even the precise instruments of the scientist require an observer who
is no disembodied spectator of isolated observable apparatus. 17
Even a supposed generalized observer [201] is one that observes by
means of a generalized human body, and not without a body, and it is the
affectiones, individual or generalized, of the body that must provide
an absolute (though not necessarily incorrigible) scale and pointer-reading for
man’s knowledge of his complement under the shortcircuiting of the human body
– and thus (under correction) of the world is the integration of the body and
its complement. In a word, where natural science is rightly content to short-circuit
(and thus exclude from Nature) the ineluctable body of the observer (individual
or generalized) corrected to normality, natural philosophy must embark on a final
movement of integration bringing the body of the observer within the ambit of
Nature, not as one of the observables (for in act it is the instrument,
and not one of the objects, of observation), but as the fundamental variable
the variations of which alone register the nature of its complement, which is
thus observed in its affected nature. The affectiones of the body are
thus, as I have said, the pointer-readings that measure the nature of the body’s
congruent complement on the scale of its reactive nature. What the mind observes
is its own disc and pointer, and from these taken together, in the light
of their presuppositions, we must gather the essential nature of the physical
real. 18 Man [202] measures
what is not man by his affectiones, and the world of observable Nature
is thus his bodily affectiones projected upon, and decoratively shading,
the screen of his partial community with his other with the unintelligible data
of its partiality. But it is not from these data that knowledge of Nature
as integrating man and his complement must be sought. Such knowledge must come
from the emendation of their relativity as resulting from the human predicament;
and that cannot be accomplished by any generalization or integration of their
relativities. Knowledge of the whole is not to be sought in the perspective of
the part, but only in the emendation of the part to the fashion of the whole
– a process that is only possible in so far as the part is no mere section or
selection of the whole, but its microcosm, reproducing in its limited form the
nature of the macrocosm, and, in its own perspective, confusedly reproducing
the nature of its complement. And a true natural philosophy must proceed by rational
speculation (as opposed to imaginative guesswork), within the framework thus
provided, to the determination of the nature of the physical macrocosm, and even
of the negation that is implicit in its determinate nature as “physical”.
V
We are now in a position to understand the significance of Ethices
II., xiii. with its elaboration and éclaircissements in the propositions,
postulates and lemmata that follow. These are, of course, partly epistemological
in character and partly physical, but it is with their physical significance
that we are now concerned. Emphasis is repeatedly placed by Spinoza upon the
“fitness of the body for doing or suffering many things” as reciprocating with
the mind’s power of [203] understanding or perceiving many things 19
(a principle which is vitally prominent again in the ethical portions of the
treatise). 20 The Lemmata
then expound the broad principles of corporeal individuation and integration,
beginning with “very simple bodies” 21
distinguished only by their “motion and rest, speed and slowness”. These are
determined by one another, 22 in
such a manner that the determination of each is a function of its own nature
and also the nature of its other. 23
Spinoza then passes to the way in which complex individuals are constituted,
and the relations holding between their simpler parts, in virtue of which they
are individuals. The human body is thus constituted of parts which are affected
in various ways by external things; 24
it retains “vestigia” of these affectiones, and in turn reacts
on these things and thus affects them. 25
Further, each affectio of the body is a function of its own nature and
of the nature of the external thing affecting it; so that in perceiving its own
body with its affectiones it is eo ipso perceiving the natures
of external things as involved in the nature of its own body: 26
more or less abstractly according to the hierarchical perfection or imperfection
of the body; and more or less confusedly as it has less or more in common with
external things, i.e. according as its affectiones correspond with
the intrinsic natures of external things. 27
We have thus passed from the simple affirmation of Ethices II.,
xiii. that the human mind perceives only its own body, to the series of propositions
and corollaries following the Lemmata (in which the hierarchical individuation
of Nature is indicated) according to which the mind, in perceiving its own body
with its affectiones, in the same act perceives the nature [204]
of many things 28 in terms of their
community (more or less limited and confused by projection upon the reference
system of the body) with the body, 29
and as present distinct from the body by reason of the body’s reagency to their
agency; 30 and further, the mind
perceives its body, and knows it to exist, only through these same affectiones
registering in it the actions of other things as evoking the reactions of the
body. 31 Though the mind perceives
only its body, yet to perceive the body as existing alone would
be to perceive an illusion: for the body is nothing save as reactive focalization
of its complement in Nature up to the measure of their community of essence,
i.e. in so far as the body is “fit for doing or suffering many things”.
In perceiving its body as affected the mind perceives its complement as affecting
it: the body and its other are at once distinct as poles of a common
stress, and identical as poles of a common stress. It is thus that
in so far as the affectio confuses the natures of self and other (through
defective community) they remain one for observation, yet distinct as
mutual agents. Contrariwise, in so far as the affectio (by reason
of perfect community) is clear and distinct, observation of an other gives
place to love for another.
In mera experientia these conditions are operant together
in various measures: in part, there must always be some measure of clarity in
our affectiones, since all interaction is based on community; 32
in part, there is always some measure of [205] confusion in mera experientia,
through which the other presents unintelligible content for observation – content
the unintelligibility of which so darkens our awareness as to startle the commonsense
consciousness into the fundamental empiricistic error of supposing that here
we have “fact” par excellence, the reality of which, as resisting intellectual
analysis, posits itself as transcendent. And beyond this, as with all human percipience,
there is simple defect by reason of the stultitude of the human body. Thus there
is formed the perception of a world of qualified “things” external to, and acting
upon, one another: the “common order of nature” variously compounding the elements
of objective datum, of relation, and of limitation – a world that is the
body of the perceiver with its affectiones. mirrored to the mind in the
speculum of the active other, of which the body is the otherwise unperceived
reactive focalization.
VI
What, then, is the true “pathway to Reality”? Broadly speaking
it is the accommodation of the human body to the nature of the universe. But
this is evidently a process subject to strict limitation: for the human body
is, after all, only a subordinate part of Nature, a microcosm of the macrocosm
which, as such, has its proper limitations. The most that can legitimately be
sought is thus their extension to their limit, and (more especially) the clarification
of, its affectiones – the broadening of mera experientia and the
elucidation of its confusion. In Nature as it is in itself all things enjoy perfect
community as flowing from their unique and indivisible source, and their affectiones
are individually constitutive “without confusion of persons”. Confusion arises
from the eccentric reference of all things to the partial self to which the part
is decoyed by its own simultaneous partiality and distinctness; distinction is
read as isolation with external relation, and the indivisible Nature that integrates
self and complement is projected in the perspective of the part as a world of
more or less unintelligible others from which the body-in-act is distributively
absent (while yet forming a part [206] of it by distributive remainder –
which remainder, by illegitimate imputation, is taken as total). Thus the proper
defect of the part, with its proper perfection, becomes the source of the privation
and eccentric projection of the remainder in the reference system of the part:
an “imagination” that can only be corrected to yield a true view of the whole
by “referring all things to God”, i.e. by so transcending the axes of
the self as that both self and complement are understood as flowing from the
undivided essence of Nature the absolute “origin” of the reference system of
creation. In that creative perspective the human body is a microcosm
reproducing in its measure the “fashion or make of the whole universe” 33,
a reactive focalization of its complement in Nature, with which (in so far as
the body is responsive to its other) it is identical in mode and distinct in
agency – forming with it, as it were, a universal stress of “action and reaction
equal and opposite”: a cross-section of the hierarchy of creation. 34 [207]
VII
Aptness of the human mind for understanding Nature thus corresponds
with the aptness of the human body “for doing and suffering many things”, and
it will be well, in conclusion, to inquire into the degree and the limitations
of this aptitude. There is nothing in Nature as veridically observed, or rightly
inferred from what is so observed, that is not an affectio of the body
of the observer, clearly and intelligibly identifying the natures of both body
and its complement, or obscurely and unintelligibly combining them under unilateral
reference to the axes of the body. In things as they are in themselves in the
eternal stream of creation, in so far as there is community of nature in the
body and its complement, they form the identity of a single stressed system the
poles of which are mutually reactive. Projected upon the axes of the body, however,
this mutuality is restricted and the identity destroyed so far as relates to
reality, while being retained in appearance (hence the body-in-act and
its complement for observation are identical), so [208] that the
bodily affectiones confuse the natures of body and complement, and can
be rightly imputed to neither in itself. In this eccentric perspective the way
to truth seems to lie in the analysis of the affectiones so as to reconstruct
body and complement in isolation. But this process can proceed but a little way
(to parody Bacon – sufficient to “convince” positivism but not to “inform” metaphysics)
sufficient to exclude perceptual illusions and objective obfuscations, but not
to establish reality. For the body and its other are not as such isolable, but
actively distinct while remaining internally related. Each is in the end constituted
by its affectiones. Truth, therefore, lies not in the mere analysis of
the bodily affectiones but in their emendation to intelligible form by
the correction of the axes of reference by relation to which they are unintelligible.
In so far as there is difference of nature between the body and its other (a
difference necessarily embedded in identity) the body is inapt to react to the
action of the other. And this stultitude must affect the mind’s cognizance of
its other, in reality limiting it, and in appearance confusing its limited apprehension.
Its limitation is its ignorance, its confusion the seat of error in so
far as unintelligible affectiones are taken as verificatory norms, i.e.
as revealing the character either of the body itself or of its other as it is
in itself, as distinct interacting physical agents. Thus the power of the mind
to understand Nature corresponds with the aptness of the body for actualizing
its other by reaction to its agency; and the impotence of the mind to render
its affectiones intelligible arises from the privation of the mutuality
of body and other as agents-in-act by the unilateral projection of their stress
upon its bodily pole.
Putting aside the problem of ignorance (founded upon bodily indifference
to factors in the real), and of the grounds of our awareness of ignorance, as
beyond our present scope, we may say that the intelligibility or otherwise of
the objects of our cognizance measures the aptness or otherwise of our bodies
for doing and suffering many things. 35
In fact, of course, [209] these objects are always in part intelligible
and in part unintelligible – for mere data are nothing but “blind spots”
on the field of mental vision. The resolution of the phenomenality of the “common
order of nature” lies in the simultaneous integration of the body with its complement
in Nature, and the emendation of the body’s eccentric perspective of Nature.
And the one entails the other.
Further, this simultaneous integration and emendation is possible
only because, and in so far as, the body is a microcosm of Nature, and thus at
once finite in fact and infinite in principle, i.e. because, and in so
far as. Nature integrates the body and its complement so that the body is a part
of Nature apt to do and to suffer many things from its complement. As the body
is finite in fact its objects are for it ineluctable (and this is the foundation
of their unintelligible givenness: we continue to see the “straight staff bent
in a pool” even after we have learnt the true cause of the appearance); as it
is infinite in principle its objects are recognized as phenomenal (and this is
the foundation of their reality under correction: “demonstrations are the eyes
of the mind”). It is the finiteness, the partiality, of the body in Nature that
abstracts our grasp of Nature; it is the self-centred eccentricity of the body
that is the root of unintelligibility in the “common order of nature”, and of
the topsyturvydom by which the body which, in act, is no object to the mind that
animates it, is apprehended as [210] revealing an external world of reactive
Nature decorated with mere data that are the affectiones of the
body in its distributive reciprocity with a complement partially pulverized by
abstraction from the “infinite, unique and indivisible” 36
Nature by relative isolation over against the body. The tail of the “Prince Rupert’s
Drop” of Nature is broken off, and the whole resolved to fragments. In the creative
integrity of Nature alone lies reality; in the relativity of the observation
by one part of the others, phenomenality; and truth is to be found only through
the realization of the relations of all microcosms with each other and with the
macrocosm, characteristic of eternal creation. “Fact” may be “observed”, but
“reality” can only be “loved”. All things must therefore be “referred to God”, 37
correcting the eccentricity of the self-isolated and self-referent microcosm;
and in that “emendation of the understanding” the identity of the animated body
with its reciprocating complement in Nature is known as active love for the reactive
other, by which self and other are mutually constituted. For appearance, as in
reality, finite self and other are one in modality, other in agency; and in its
perfection this identity in otherness is but an abstractive differentiation of
the “infinite love wherewith God loves himself” 38
in the creative action by which the infinite indeterminate potency is expressed
in act in infinitely determinate form, as “infinite things follow in infinite
ways from the necessity of the divine nature”. 39
For the integrity of Nature, like the integrity of love, is the union of the
self with its absolute other that is also its complement and absolute expression;
and from the relation of God and the world is derived, and abstracted as its
dim reflection, the relation of the self with its intelligible other. [211]
a reflection that is contorted and confused as the self deifies itself as cosmic,
and is amply discredited by the appearance of unintelligible data in the
transparency of its intellectual vision. So far, therefore, from such data constituting
veriflcatory norms of certitude, they verify only the impotence of their recipients,
and the “fall” that must follow upon their idle wish to be “as gods”. [212]
H.F. Hallett
King’s College, London
1 Other prominent
examples of imputed incoherence (I say “imputed” to guard against the supposition
that I recognize it as just in either case) are his reputed atomism in physics
(based on his idea of the
corpus simplicissimum) with his monism in natural
philosophy, and his implied attribution of a measure of moral freedom to a being
subject to universal necessity. But the former concerns only topics incompletely
expounded – indeed in part avoided (
Eth. II., xiii. Sch.) and in
part left for further study (
Ep. lxxxiii S.) and the latter would at worst
but divorce the ethical doctrine from the ontology, and leave open a final problem
which (as we now see) might be attacked (if not resolved) by a Kantian approach.
2
Spinoza, His Life and Philosophy,
(2nd ed.), pp. 123-26.
3
Tract. de Intell. Emend., § 33.
4 Pollock,
loc. cit., p. 125, n.
5 “I am carrying about a very solid and
rather long-winded study of Spinoza’s philosophy... called
Aeternitas,
by one Hallett” (
The Pollock-Holmes Letters. F. Pollock, August 29, 1931).
6 H. Barker, “Notes on the Second Part
of Spinoza’s
Ethics, (II)” (
Mind, XLVII., N.S., p. 295).
7 H. Barker,
loc. cit., pp. 295-96.
8 Sight, like all sense-perception, is
essentially a function of a finite individual with respect to its other; the
“eye of God” that “sees all things”, “sees” them as “conscience” within each.
9
Principles, § 116.
10 The application of these principles
to the different senses as these are
externally conceived is, of course,
on no unvarying plan, though as conceived as
senses-in-act the differences
are less striking. Sight, in terms of which my exposition has, in the main, been
fashioned (the world of sight having a greater temporal totality than the world
of touch) presents objects
at a distance from the objective eye, whereas
touch is a contact-perception. Thus an account in terms of touch would, perhaps,
seem to the unconverted less speculative than one in terms of sight, since here
what lies on the near side of the common surface of contact is “body”, and what
lies on the far side is the tactual “other”. But yet, I suggest, even this difference
is but another example of the main principle, and what seem for
another
perceiver to be the limits of the “body” may not be its true limits for the percipient
himself. The blind man (as Descartes points out)
feels the pavement
with the ferule of his stick; and when I observe Orion my eye-in-act (
i.e.
my total optical system) extends to the limit of my visual percipience –
it “rests upon Orion” (
vide “On Things in Themselves”,
Philosophy XIV.,
1939, p. 177, n.).
11
Eth. I., xxv. Cor.
12 “
Affectio” is to be distinguished
from “affectus” which is a
disposition towards another arising from an
affectio or
state determined by that other.
13
Principia I., Def. iii.
14
Eth. II., Ax. i. post Lem. iii. Cor.
15 What this means is that the notion
of otherwise isolated bodies impinging on one another is an abstraction:
at
impact they form a strained
totum; as
isolated they are but
abstracted “poles” of “universal” stresses relative to themselves – and in that
relation alone are actual. Thus the finite body is at once an abstraction taken
alone, and an actual reactive “pole” of “universal” stress. Yet the universe
as a whole suffers no stress, for it is complementary, not to any actual part
of itself but, so to say, to the point-instant, which is nothing actual, and
nothing distinct.
16 Those who have supposed that Spinoza’s
doctrine entails the illusoriness of all finite modes in the integrity of Nature,
have perhaps been influenced by some such error. I am not as yet able to say
whether Whitehead himself does or does not, in whole or in part, avoid the error.
17 Many philosophers (and some scientists)
have realized the importance of the
observer in the understanding of Nature,
but one and all have thought of the observer as a localized and dated
mind
to be corrected for by the elimination of all supposedly mental additions to
the physical objects. This is a fundamental and far-reaching error. It is the
body of the observer that is located and dated as an
object, and
is instrumental as the ineluctable instrument of perception. And it is the
relativity
of the objects of perception and science to this unnoted medium that cries aloud
for correction in a credible natural philosophy.
Perhaps I may be allowed to add, in this connexion, that
it is this forgetfulness of the function of the body in perception that has led
so many thinkers to embrace an idealistic philosophy. Realizing that the physical
world is no isolated
datum externally related to the percipient, they
have hastily concluded that it is internally related to the percipient
mind
– an [201] error that has, perhaps, been made more credible by the absence
for perception-in-act of the percipient’s own body from the observed world. And
when they have brought themselves to consider the status of the percipient’s
body in relation to his mind, they have been content to regard it as one of the
objects internally related to his mind though accidentally occulted in the act
of perception. Its essential instrumentality in perception has thus been at once
allowed and ignored. The primary derelativization of which the observed world
stands in need is of its relation to the body-in-act, and not of relation to
finite mind; and this is a process that may require the re-interpretation of
the nature of physical things as agents and reagents. out can hardly require
their reduction to the status of “ideal contents” ordered by mental activity.
18 The same principle is also applicable
to the instruments of scientific practice: we must know
what they measure
– the nature of the variables in the mathematical expressions of natural process
and constitution. Mere pointer-readings are without significance save as we presume
the nature of their measurables. Nor (though these are often reducible to functions
of [202] the measures of more elementary variables – as “kinetic energy”,
e.g., is a function of “mass” and “velocity”) can measures alone constitute
a measurable, however simple it may be. Even “space-time” requires a foot-rule
and a clock if it is to be measured – or some substitute for these.
19
Eth. II., xiii. Sch.
20 Cf.
Eth. IV., xxxviii; V., xi., xiii., xxxix.
21 “
Corpora simplicissima”.
22
Eth. II., Lem. iii.
23
Eth. II., Ax. i. post Lem. iii.
24
Eth. II., Post. iii. post Lem. vii.
25
Eth. II., Postt. iii., v., vi. post Lem. vii.
26
Eth. II., xvi. et Corr. i. et ii.
27
Eth. II., xxxviii, xxxix.
28
Eth. II., xvi. Cor. i.
29
Eth. II., xvi. Cor. ii.
30
Eth. II., xvii. It
ought to be noted that Spinoza is here led, by his wish to explain the bases
of fictitious imagination and memory (
Eth. II., xvii. Cor., Sch., xviii.
et Sch.), to leave unemphasized the real source of our belief in the present
existence of external things,
viz. their reagency to the agency of the
body. For we do not, in fact, merely await a new
affectio to exclude that
which has occurred in order to discover whether a thing has been removed – we
seek a new
affectio by experimental activity But of course the agency
and reagency of self and other are intuited as mutual.
31
Eth. II., xix.
32
Eth. I., iii.
33 “
Facies totius universi”
(
Ep. lxiv.). As I have often said, the universal translation of “
facies”
as “face” in this phrase is most unfortunate, emphasizing as it does the danger
of identification with the visible universe, or “common order of nature”.
34 To this cross-sectional structure
there are set two limits: Nature as a whole, and the “point-instant”, neither
of which is a self acted upon and reacting to a complement. The latter raises
no special difficulty, for the point-instant is the zero focus of all stress
in Nature – a mere ideal limit without modality, or even
distinct place
and date. The former,
viz. Nature as a whole, might seem also, on the
principles elaborated, to be an unreal limit in the absence of a complement awaking
it to reaction. Such a supposition is based, however, on a too abstract reading
of the character of the stresses of finite bodies in Nature. We think of two
bodies as actualizing each other by impact, through which the
vis impressa
of each evokes the
vis insita of the other – forgetting that two bodies
can only impinge on each other if they are
in motion relative to one another.
But, indeed, just as a man who pushes a boat into the water presses the ground
under his feet in the opposite direction, and the water presses backwards upon
the boat, with equal force (the changes of relative motion in the system being
changes in
affectio in its parts by reason of these balanced pressures
operating on bodies of unequal mass), so the reaction of bodies in impact are
balanced by the assumed, but neglected, actions by which the bodies are in relative
motion. Thus each body is not only a pole of external stress but [207] also
the seat of internal stress, and is concretely actualized only thereby. In imputing
relative motion to the impinging bodies, we are abstracting from their concrete
setting in Nature, and supposing (with Descartes) that the motion
belongs
to the bodies, and that the impact of bodies thus constituted can provide
a
priori principles for the deduction of the results of impact of complex bodies,
more or less elastic, regarded as “second order” phenomena. But all bodies are
complex and in some measure elastic – nor can a Cartesian simple body be intelligibly
conceived.
ABecause the actuality of
a finite body is the
reactive focalization of its complement in Nature,
a multipolar stress balancing the multipolar stress of its complement, Nature
as a whole is the very basis of the reality of both, and no mere ideal limit.
A Descartes’s
Rules
of Motion in Impact, taken as directly applicable to empirical bodies, seem
to assume perfect elasticity where change of direction is required, and perfect
inelasticity where it is not. Hence the apparent contradiction of his assertions
that all motion is relative, and that the result of the impact of two bodies
with a given relative motion depends on whether both are moving in the same or
opposite directions, or one is at rest. But, of course, Descartes himself never
supposed that his Rules are capable of such direct application, seeing that all
bodies are, for him, embedded in the plenum (
vide Princip. Philos., II., Artt.
53, 56-60).
35 The difficulty that may here be
raised is that the intelligible and unintelligible elements of objective Nature
seem to be inextricable.
A But [209]
this is a problem only for those who regard the axe and the shovel as the sole
implements of the philosopher. We are not bound to accept either the realism
of commonsense, the abstract realism of science, or the physical unrealism of
Berkeley – for the disjunction is based on the assumption that the percipient
is a disembodied spectator of the universe. And no such observer is to be found.
Doubtless the factors of illusion in our contemplated world do, in their degree,
limit the reality of the factors of reality, just as the latter lend reality
to the former. But this intelligible-unintelligible world is not given to disembodied
mind, but is an abstraction of the physically real complement of the observer’s
body as it is actualized relative to at body, and in active contrast with it
as reactive focalization.
A E.g. Berkeley’s
refusal to separate sense-quality from extension, and to affirm the physical reality
of the latter while denying it to the former.
36
Ep. xii,
37
Eth. II., xxxii.
38
Eth. V., xxxi, xxxvi.
39
Eth. I., xvl.